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Banking Sector
I. INTRODUCTION
China's banking sector is slated to open completely to foreign
access in 2006 in accordance with China's World Trade Organization
("WTO") accession agreement.' The opportunity for entry into a 1.3
billion-person 2 market, with over $1.8 trillion in personal savings, 3 has
left many banks salivating. Yet while the enormous opportunity is
clear, the exact path is not.4 This Note will examine potential barriers
and obstacles to foreign investment in China's banking sector and will
analyze the benefits of acquiring equity shares in domestic banks.5
Part II of this Note provides some basic background concerning
the evolving Chinese economy and China's banking sector.6 Part III
examines the major factors that foreign investors must weigh as they
consider how best to gain entry to the Chinese banking market.7
Finally, Part IV demonstrates that equity acquisition has been the
primary path of entry into the Chinese banking market and analyzes
how this approach effectively deals with some of the concerns and
challenges described in Part 111.8
1. Richard McGregor, Foreign Banks Count the Days to China's WTO Link, FIN.
TIMEs (London), May 18, 2001, at 23.
2. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 114 (Central Intelligence
Agency 2004), available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html.
3. See Brian Bremner, Betting on China's Banks: The Biggest IPO on Earth May
Signal the Start of a Rich, New Era in Financial Markets, Bus. WK., Oct. 31, 2005 ("The
Buy China syndrome has long gripped global investors entranced by the country's
hypergrowth story.").
4. See generally Carol G. Liu, New and Foreign Banking Markets: Scaling the Great
Wall: An Analysis of Foreign Banks' Entry into China, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 397 (2005)
(arguing that foreign banks can choose to enter the market through equity acquisition or
establishment of foreign bank branches).
5. See infra notes 6-202 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 9-38 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 39-131 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 132-95 and accompanying text.
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II. EVOLVING ECONOMY
A. Recent History
In the past twenty-seven years, China has journeyed down a
radical path of modernization and privatization.9 As a part of this
transition, the Chinese banking sector has undergone dramatic
changes.1 ° Deng Xiaoping, the de facto leader of the country, declared
in 1978 that China's banks would begin to operate like "real banks."'1
Prior to this time, China's banking sector was essentially a "monobank
financial system" whose sole aim was to further the political and social
agenda of the socialist government. 12  However, subsequently, the
Chinese government embarked on an ambitious program of
privatization and reform within the banking sector designed to facilitate
and promote continued growth of the economy.13
In 1986, China's government issued a significant set of new
banking regulations aimed at achieving these objectives. 14 Commercial
lending was separated from the People's Bank of China ("PBC") and
given to four specialized banks (the "Big Four"): 5 the Agricultural
Bank of China, the Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and the
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China.1 6 Prior to the current wave
of investment activity, the Big Four were wholly-owned by the
government. 17 In 1994, the government formed three policy banks in
9. Lan Cao, Public Perspectives on Privatization: Chinese Privatization: Between
Plan and Market, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 13, 13 (2000).
10. Amy Chunyan Wu, PRC's Commercial Banking System: Is Universal Banking a
Better Model?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 623, 623 (1999); see generally Andrew
Xuefeng Qian, Transforming China's Traditional Banking Systems Under the New National
Banking Laws, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 479 (1996) (examining impact of new banking
laws on China's banking sector).
11. Chuyan, supra note 10, at 623.
12. Alicia Garcia Herrero & Daniel Santabarbara, Where is the Chinese Banking
System Going with the Ongoing Reform? 12 (2004), http://www.bde.es/informes
/be/ocasional/do04O6e.pdf).
13. See Qian, supra note 10, 480-86.
14. Id. at 482.
15. Id.
16. Wei J. Lee, China and the WTO: Moving Toward Liberalization in China's Banking
Sector, 1 DEPAuL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 481, 493 (2003).
17. Sayuri Shirai, Banking Sector Reforms in the People's Republic of China-Progress
and Constraints, in REJUVENATING BANK FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC, 49, 50 (2002), available at http://www.unescap.org/drpad/publication
/toc/fin%5F2206con.htm.
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order to further free the Big Four from making policy loans, which had
inhibited their attempts to become fully commercial.
18
While estimates vary, the Big Four currently account for
between fifty percent to sixty percent of the total assets of the Chinese
banking system.' 9 The remaining banking assets are controlled by the
three policy banks, city and nationwide commercial banks, and urban
and rural credit cooperatives. 20 And though China has gradually eased
restrictions on the ability of foreign banks to operate in the country, as
of September 2003, foreign banks held only 1.2% of total banking
assets.2 '
China's two major regulatory institutions are the PBC and the
China Banking and Regulatory Commission ("CBRC"), which are both
ultimately accountable to the State Council, China's governing 
body. 22
The PBC's major responsibilities include setting and overseeing
monetary policy and managing and maintaining payment systems.
23
Established in April 2003, the CRBC plays a supervisory role,
overseeing and regulating banks and other financial institutions.24
B. Further Opening of the Financial Sector
China's plan for financial modernization continued as China
sought admittance to the WTO in the late 1990s. 25  As part of its
accession to the WTO in 2001, China agreed to completely open its
markets to foreign competition. 26 A five-year plan is in place, at the end
18. Qian, supra note 10, at 484; see also Lawrence L. Lee, Integration of International
Financial Regulatory Standards for the Chinese Economic Area: The Challenge for China,
Hong Kong, and Taiwan, 20 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 13 (1999) ("These 'policy' banks
include: the Import-Export Bank, which helps finance major trade deals, the State
Development Bank, which funds infrastructural projects, and the Agricultural Development
Bank of China, which funds agricultural procurement for rural development.").
19. Herrero & Santabarbara, supra note 12, at 16.
20. Shirai, supra note 17.
21. Herrero & Santabarbara, supra note 12, at 15.
22. Liu, supra note 4, at 398.
23. Id. at 399-400.
24. Id.
25. See generally Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China's WTO Accession
Saga, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1469 (2000) (detailing the specifics of China's WTO
accession).
26. Lee, supra note 16, at 481; see also SUMMARY of US-CHINA BILATERAL WTO
AGREEMENT, Feb. 2, 2000, http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/testimon/106s/daley0411
attachment.htm.
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of which, China is to completely open the banking sector,2 7 including
the "eliminat[ion of] all 'non-prudential' restrictions on the banking
sector, including ownership and operation restrictions., 28 This includes
the removal of all geographic and customer restrictions currently in
place; by the end of 2006, foreign banks are, in theory, to be treated in
the exact same manner as Chinese banks.2 9
C. An Enormous Growth Opportunity for Foreign Investors
The percentage of American banks' profits derived from foreign
activities has increased in recent years.30 Citigroup and JP Morgan
Chase, the two largest U.S. banks, earned half of their net income from
overseas operations.3 But while overseas activity continues to grow,
the amount of income derived from banking activity in China remains
small. a2 For instance, of the $7.65 billion of revenue reported by
Citigroup in Asia in 2004, only two percent was attributable to China.3
Given the enormous size of the Chinese market34 and its
potential for investment opportunity, 35 commentators have speculated
that banks will rush to tap into this emerging market.3 6 However, the
27. Liu, supra note 4, at 397.
28. Karen Halverson, China's WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political
Implications, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 319, 338 (2004).
29. Liu Mingkang, Chairman of China Banking Reg. Comm'n, Speech at International
Investment Forum of 2004 CFIIT: Creating a Favorable Environment for the Further
Opening of China's Banking Industry (Sept. 8, 2004) (on file with North Carolina Banking
Institute).
30. Frederick W. Stakelbeck, Jr., U.S. Banks Investing in China, IN THE NAT'L
INTEREST, Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/September
%202005/September2005Stakelbeck.html.
31. Id.
32. See Gautam Chakravorthy & Subramaniam Sharma, Citigroup's Prince Sees 50%
of Business Outside U.S., BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 14, 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com
/apps/news?pid=10000080&sid=ahaPVmMJvVOU&refer=asia.
33. Id.
34. Bank of America Buys Stake in China Bank: Move is Largest Investment in by
Foreign Financial Firm, MSNBC, June 17, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8253765/
("'This investment is aimed at creating a long-term benefit by partnering with the best
positioned bank in China, which is one of the fastest growing economies in the world with
1.3 billion consumers,' Kenneth D. Lewis, [B OF A] chairman and chief executive officer,
said in a statement.").
35. RBS Leads $3.lbn China Investment, BBC NEWS, Aug. 18, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4162170.stm ("The [Chinese] market ... is estimated to
hold $1.5 trillion in personal savings"); see also Stakelbeck, supra note 30.
36. Stakelbeck, supra note 30 ("With an astounding one billion bank customers, a
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optimal route of entry is not clear. 37 Banks can either work towards
establishing independently operating branches in anticipation of the full
relaxation of restrictions in 2006 or can choose to pursue a portion of
the Chinese banking market through acquisition of equity in existing
Chinese banks.38
III. MAJOR FACTORS To CONSIDER FOR FOREIGN BANKS
As foreign banks consider how best to gain access to this
emerging market, they must weigh a wide variety of factors which
include the following.39
A. Post-2006 Regulatory Burdens
While in principle, the Chinese government has promised to
ease all restrictions by the end of 2006, the reality is that foreign bank
branches will still be forced to deal with a host of additional regulatory
requirements.4° Though specific geographic restrictions will be eased,
foreign banks seeking to establish branches must contend with "onerous
representative office seasoning requirements; branch-level capital
reserve, liquidity, and deposit requirements; foreign exchange
deposit/foreign exchange asset ratio limitations; and lengthy branch
application procedures. '
Furthermore, China currently limits the total equity owned by
foreign investors in any one bank to twenty-five percent overall and
burgeoning middle class, cumulative household savings of $1.65 trillion and annual GDP
growth of 9 percent, China is an attractive investment alternative for banks located
throughout the world.").
37. Liu, supra note 4, at 397.
38. Id.
39. See infra notes 40-131 and accompanying text.
40. Nicholas C. Howson & Lester Ross, Foreign Minority Equity Investment in Chinese
Commercial Banks, CHINESE Bus. REv., July-Aug. 2003, available at
http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0307/howson.html
Although foreign banks will be allowed to do renminbi business with
Chinese individuals from the end of next year, lifting the last big
restriction on their activities in China, it is almost certain that the
obstacles towards any of them establishing a major branch network will
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twenty percent for a single foreign investor. 2 Various officials have
occasionally hinted that the cap may be raised 43 but, in recent
comments, China's central bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan made clear
there are no current plans in place to raise the limits.44 Zhou went even
further in asserting that China has no obligation under the WTO
agreement to raise this particular limit at all.45
B. Underdeveloped Administrative and Judicial Structures
Banking is generally a highly regulated sector and a
sophisticated banking market like that of the United States has
developed hand in hand with regulatory systems commensurate to the
task.4 6 China's administrative and regulatory framework for banking as
well as its judicial system, only now in their infancy, are faced with the
challenge of attempting to deal with an aspiring 21st century banking
system.47
When considering the ability of China's administrative and
judicial framework to handle a highly sophisticated banking market, one
must keep in mind that as recently as 1978, China had no "meaningful
legal institutions, 48 and that China's first banking regulatory agencies
were formed in 1995, just ten years ago.49 In accordance with its
accession to the WTO, China agreed to "apply and administer all WTO-
related laws, regulations, and other measures in a 'uniform, impartial
and reasonable manner."' 5 Commentators speculate that such a goal
42. Cap on Foreign Investment in Chinese Banks Remains in Place, BBC MONITORING
INT'L REPORTS, Nov. 3, 2005.
43. Michele Batchelor & Karen Gullo, China May Ease Limits on Foreign Banks,
CHINA DAILY, Sept. 14, 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-
09/14/content 477695.htm.
44. Cap on Foreign Investment, supra note 42.
45. Id.
46. See generally LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK AND
FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS, 1-79 (2nd ed. 2004) (explaining
the history of the American banking system).
47. See generally Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits
of Law: Administrative Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China, 19
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 161 (2001) (examining China's developing administrative and legal
institutions and concluding that, while progress has been made, many more changes are
needed).
48. Halverson, supra note 28, at 354.
49. See Qian, supra note 10, at 480-86.
50. Halverson, supra note 28, at 352.
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may, at least in the immediate future, be out of the reach of a fledgling
administrative and judicial system that does not have much experience
drafting clear and detailed regulations and lacks a track record or
tradition of administering law in an impartial and unbiased manner.
51
Furthermore, the difficulties that face the Chinese regulatory
system are not only organizational and technical but cultural as well.
52
As Randal Peerenboom points out, "China is a single party socialist
state saddled with a transition economy, an immature legal system, and
a historical legacy of more than two millennia in which the subordinate
role of law as a means of achieving social order stunted the growth of a
culture of legality. 53 While the cultural barriers are often more difficult
to quantify and measure, they can also often be the most intransigent.
54
This is not to say that no progress has been made.55 China has
made efforts to increase legal education and awareness.
56  The
government recently embarked on its third five-year plan to educate the
public about laws.5 7 The government has broadcast live trials on
television and sponsored radio shows in order to educate citizens about
their legal rights.58 But continuing uncertainty in the judicial and
administrative framework presents serious questions about China's
ability to handle a banking system vaulting into the 21 st century.
5 9
C. Governmental Boundaries, Transparency, and Clarity
Other related problems flow from the immaturity of China's
developing administrative and judicial system. 60 Even if China is able
to put adequate regulatory structures and systems in place, some have
speculated that Chinese administrative agencies, accustomed to
possessing broad discretion in their decision-making powers, will be
51. Id. at 352-53.
52. See Peerenboom, supra note 47, at 261.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.




60. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
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resistant to concrete restraints placed on their authority. 6' Government
agencies tend to resist any efforts directed towards decreasing the extent
of their control and oversight. 62 And the "lack of transparency, public
supervision, and right of access to information" will only make the
government agencies more prone to corruption.63 Furthermore, reliance
on the public and the media to serve as a curtailing influence on
government power is not a viable option in China, given the lack of
access to information and the tight control exerted by the government
over the media.64
Examples of inadequate or inequitable administrative
procedures abound.65  The Office of the United States Trade
Representative reports that in 2002, Chinese ministries and agencies
failed to provide adequate opportunity for public comment on new and
modified regulations despite a 2001 mandate from the State Council to
improve such procedures. 6 Such procedural shortcomings necessarily
"undercut the predictability and openness of the Chinese business
climate. 67
D. Non-Performing Loans
The staggering amount of non-performing loans ("NPLs")
which remain on the books of Chinese banks also concerns investors.68
The existence of NPLs is a legacy of the role that China's banking
system played prior to the current reforms. 69 At that time, banks served
primarily as a funding source for programs dictated by state-owned
enterprises.7 °
61. Peerenboom, supra note 47, at 179.
62. Id. at 185.
63. Id. ("The absence of democratic traditions may explain in part why China has been
slow to pass a procedural law that would provide effective channels for public participation
in these processes.").
64. Id.
65. See Peter K. Yu ET AL., China and The WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17
COLUM. J. AsIAN L. 1, 21 (2003).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Louise do Rosario, Bad Debt Mountain a Persistent Obstacle, BANKER, Jan. 1,
2003, at 73.
69. Hui Cao, Asset Securitization: Is it a Resolution Option For China's Non-
Performing Loans?, 28 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 565, 571 (2003).
70. Id.
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While precise numbers are unclear, the current overall picture is
not positive.7' Scholars have speculated the NPLs comprised anywhere
from ten percent to forty percent of all banking assets.72 Dai Xianglong,
the governor of the PBC "officially recognized that the ratio of NPLs to
total outstanding loans at the [B]ig [F]our was 25%" in 1999."
3 In 2001,
Standard and Poor's ("S&P") predicted that the Big Four would require
$540 billion, half of China's annual GDP, to account for NPLs.
74
Official figures from the Chinese government indicate that the
amount of NPLs "fell to 13.2% at the end of 2004, compared with
eighteen per cent the year before.,
75 However, some western analysts
disagree with such assessments and put the amount of NPLs in the
banking system at around forty percent.
76 In May 2005, S&P put the
figure at around thirty-one percent.7
7 Others suggest "the staggering
figure of NPLs has already made the [B]ig [F]our technically
insolvent. 78 Furthermore, some commentators assert that the abuse of
the state-owned banking system continues today, with government
71. See infra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
72. Cao, supra note 69.
73. Id.
74. Id; see also Robyn Meredith, China Fever: Mainland Stocks are Hot, but Many Are
Just Sick, FORBES, July 4, 2005, at 83 ("Some of the biggest China IPOs due this year are in
the shaky sector of banking. Academics and economists outside China say 25% of all
Chinese bank loans are bad. A bailout would cost China a punishing 17% of its gross
domestic product, or $280 billion, UBS says.").
75. C.P. Chandrasekhar, Chinese Banking: The New Frontier for Global Finance,
MACROSCAN, Sept. 30, 2005, http://www.macroscan.com/cur/sep05/cur30
0 9O5Chinese
_Banking.htm.
76. HSBC to Pay $1.75b in Landmark China Bank Deal, DAILY TIMES, Aug. 8, 2004,
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_8-8-2004_pg5_
22 ; see also Billion-
Dollar Gamble; Foreign Investment in China's Banks, ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 2005 ("To
spruce themselves up for listing, the banks have been selling off their old non-performing
loans: they even put their bad-loan ratios in single digits, although the true figures are
probably still much higher.").
77. Brian Bremner & Dexter Roberts, Wanted: A Big Broom For China's Banks:
Beying is trying to sweep away corruption and bad loans at its huge state lenders before
taking them public, Bus. WK. ONLINE, May 9, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com
/magazine/content/05_ 19/b3932074.htm.
78. Cao, supra note 69, at 572; see also Craig Phillips, Banks Have a Long Way to Go
to Win Confidence, THE AGE, Oct. 21, 2005, http://www.theage.com.au/news/business/
banks-have-a-long-way-to-go-to-win-confidence/2005/10/20/1129775901483.html
("Meanwhile it was recently touted that to fix China's bad loans fiasco in the country's
state-owned commercial banks alone, the Chinese Government would have to fork out the
equivalent of 44 per cent of the nation's gross national product (GNP). This, according to
the latest figures released by the World Bank, equates to approximately $1 trillion.").
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officials using the banks as piggy banks for government projects.79
Though the Chinese government has sought to make banks assume full
responsibility for profits and losses, progress has been slow. 0 Great
pressure still exists to make loans to state-owned enterprises or recently
privatized state-owned enterprises that are still controlled by party
leaders."
Steps have been taken to address the problem.82 In 1998, the
Chinese government "bailed out [the Big Four] with capital infusion of
$33 billion '8 3 and in 2004 gave over $45 billion to the Bank of China
and China Construction Bank, in an effort to rid the banks of bad
loans.8 4 In 1999, China also removed over $169 billion worth of NPLs
from the Big Four and sent them to asset management companies."
China hopes that these efforts will stabilize the banks and allow them to
79. Yu et al., supra note 65, at 6-7.
80. Nicholas R. Lardy, When Will China's Financial System Meet China's Needs? (Ctr.
for Res. on Econ. Dev. and Pol'y Reform, Working Paper No. 54, 2000), available at
http://scid.stanford.edu/pdf/credpr55.pdf
81. Bremner & Roberts, supra note 77; see also Cao, supra note 9 at 38-40.
Despite financial-sector reforms in which the government replaced
direct subsidies to state enterprises with bank loans-again, in an effort
to create some semblance of hard budget constraints on the relevant
economic actors--capital, in the form of bank credit, continues to be
lavished upon state enterprises at the request of the managers, regardless
of whether the loans will be repaid .... State-owned commercial banks,
which are theoretically self-supporting but in reality supported by the
state, continue to provide credit to state firms on non-market terms,
performing none of the functions associated with commercial lending,
neither screening the borrowers for creditworthiness nor monitoring and
enforcing the loans. In fact, banks are often directed by the central
government to make non-commercial, policy-based loans to certain state
firms, in which case the loans may be supported by the credit of the
central bank itself, the [PBC], based on lending quotas allocated by the
PBC to regional banks nationwide. Banks may also be pressured by
provincial and local government agencies into making loans to
politically favored state enterprises, a problem that has grown even
worse because of decentralization.
Id.
82. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text; see also Phillips, supra note 78 ("It
cannot be stressed too much that financial markets are essentially information-processing
systems and the lack of information and data seriously impairs their operation.").
83. Michael Backman, Lining Up to Join China Bank Crisis, THE AGE, Oct. 5, 2005,
http://www.theage.0/m.au/news/business/lining-up-to-join-china-bank-crisis/ 05/10/04/
11 28 191714880.html?oneclick=true.
84. Li Yong Yan, China's $45 Billion Bank Headache, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 9,
2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FA09AdO2.html.
85. Cao, supra note 69, at 565.
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better cope with the increased competition that will come with the full
opening of the Chinese market.86 However, only time will tell just how
endemic the NPL problem truly 
is.87
E. Limited Chinese Credit Assessment Capabilities Leading to
More NPLs
Related to the NPL issue is the reality that many of the large
state-owned banks lack expertise or refinement in basic areas such as
effective corporate governance techniques and credit evaluation.
88 Prior
to the current banking reforms, most lending was oriented around
fostering development goals and plans of the government rather than the
dictates of the market.89 Thus, China's banks have not been forced by
market pressures to develop functional systems to evaluate credit,
quality and adequacy of collateral, and other basic lending
considerations.9" Furthermore, the lack of reliable sources for even
beginning to gather credit information on potential borrowers further
hampers the development of efficient and profitable lending practices.
91
While progress has been made in evaluating credit, such skills are still
in their infancy.92
For instance, as recently as April 2000, commentators pointed
out that annual reports issued by some of the largest state-owned banks
''rarely even mention selectivity in their lending or any indicator of
improvements in their financial performance that might follow from
increasing selectivity. 93  Instead of including information related to
lending proficiency such as rate of return on equity or share of NPLs,
the banks included information related to the absolute size of lending
and deposits, signaling a continued fundamentally flawed conception of
banking.94 There are major institutional changes that must be made
86. Yan, supra note 84.
87. See generally James Kynge, 'Bold Action Needed' on China's Banks' Bad Loans,
FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 1, 2002, at 14 (discussing speculation by some analysts who
believe NPLs are actually increasing).
88. See infra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
89. Cao, supra note 69, at 571.
90. Id. at 572.
91. Id.
92. Herrero & Santabarbara, supra note 12, at 23.
93. Lardy, supra note 80, at 33.
94. Id. at 33-34.
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before balance sheets can be cleaned up and a true "commercial credit
culture [can take] hold."9'
Furthermore, with such a short history of practicing market-
driven lending, the managerial talent needed to run a successful bank is
also lacking.96 Many of the banks do not possess essential oversight and
corporate governance structures needed to operate efficiently.97 For
instance, when Frank Newman, a former U.S. Treasury Department
Official and current executive with a Chinese bank visited China in
2005, he was surprised to find no financial reports on a "particular $25
billion institution." 98 Newman observed that, "In all my years of
banking, I've never seen anything like it." 99 Without increased credit
evaluation capabilities and managerial and technical know-how,
Chinese banks are likely to continue to make bad loans, and the NPL
problem may continue or even worsen in the indefinite future.'00
F. Corruption
This lack of oversight, structure, and technical knowledge has
also led to a great deal of corruption.' ° China Daily reported that
"China's 2004 state audit report... uncovered billions of dollars of
graft and misappropriation even as the state-run media questioned the
government's resolve in fighting corruption.' ' 0 2 In January 2005, two
95. Id. at 41.




100. Bremner, supra note 3; see also Billion-Dollar Gamble; Foreign Investment in
China's Banks, supra note 76 ("Nor, despite due diligence, do the foreigners really know
how clean their partners' books are."); see also Matthias Bekeir, Drowned in a Sea of Debt,
McKINSEY & Co., Jan. 26, 2005, http://www.mckinsey.com/ideas/infocus/china
/debtsea.asp.
China's financial regulators may have stepped up their efforts to clean
up the existing stock of non-performing loans, but the country's banking
system has yet to deal with another source of instability-new bad
debt.... While much progress has been made in China's biggest banks
scheduled for public listing, less has been done to stem the flow of new
bad debt in the 120-odd regional and local banks and nearly 30,000
credit co-operatives which hold up to 30 per cent of the country's
banking assets.
Id.
101. Peerenboom, supra note 47, at 225.
102. Former Bank Chief Tried on Corruption Charges, CHINA DAILY, July 14, 2005,
A I^
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senior officials from the Bank of China disappeared after allegedly
embezzling up to $120 million dollars' 3 and Liu Guangyi received a
life sentence for stealing $13.4 million while serving as branch head of
China Construction Bank in the southern province of Guangdon.' °4 Liu
Jinbao received a death sentence (which was eventually suspended) in
August 2005 after his conviction for stealing $953,000 as chief of the
Bank of China's Hong Kong arm. 0 5  Such ongoing fraud not only
damages the balance sheets of the banks but also reveals continuing
weaknesses in the structures of many of China's banks.1
0 6
G. A Nation in Flux
In just under thirty years, China has radically transformed its
economic structures through a vast program of privatization, resulting in
dramatic changes to the economic realities of the country. 0 7 What is
not clear is how these vast economic changes will affect the cultural and
political realities of a nation that is the only Communist member of the
WTO.1
0 8
Investors, blinded by prospects of unparalleled opportunity,
should not overlook the fact that China does not have laws protecting
many of the rights and freedoms recognized by Western nations. 0 9
Many expect that as China pursues economic growth down the path of
increasing economic openness and freedom, further personal and
political rights and freedoms will blossom as well." 0 But it is not yet
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-07/14/content_460222.htm.
103. Millions Go Missing at China Bank, BBC NEwS, Jan. 24, 2005, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/l/hi/business/4201279.stm.
104. China Bank Boss Jailed for Fraud, BBC NEWS, Jan. 23, 2005, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/4199295.stm.
105. China Bank Ex-Exec Gets Suspended Death Sentence, MuzI NEWS, Aug. 12, 2005,
http://dailynews.muzi.com/ll/english/1375562.shtml; Former Bank Chief Tried On
Corruption Charges, CHINA DAILY, July 14, 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn
/english/doc/2005-07/14/content_460222.htm.
106. See supra notes 88-105 and accompanying text
107. See supra notes 9-24 and accompanying text.
108. Halverson, supra note 28, at 320.
109. See generally Human Rights in China, http://www.hrichina.org/public/
indexhttp://hrw.org/doc/?t-asia&c=china (last visited Jan. 23, 2006) (advocating for more
awareness and response to human rights violations in China); Human Rights Watch: Asia,
http://hrw.org/doc/?t-asia&c=china (last visited Jan. 23, 2006) (publicizing ongoing human
rights violations in China); Yu et al., supra note 65, at 26.
110. Daniel T. Griswold, Trading Tyranny for Freedom: How Open Markets Till the Soil
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clear whether this theory will become a reality."' While China may be
applauded for its rapid economic liberalization, concurrent political and
human rights reforms have been slow. 1 2 In the midst of the economic
and legal changes that have accompanied China's WTO accession, "the
[Chinese Communist Party] has endeavored to maintain rigid control
over other spheres of Chinese society."
' 13
While the "need to sustain economic growth will continue to put
pressure on China's leaders to carry out reforms, even if this results in
further erosion of the Party's power,"'" 4 it is unclear how far the
government will be willing to go." 5 The freeing of the market place
will make it increasingly difficult for the Chinese Communist Party
("CCP") to control individuals, but the Chinese leadership will likely
remain vigilant in its protection of power, using repression when
necessary. 1 6 And it would not be hard to imagine a scenario in which
these contrasts lead to political and social unrest and instability which
can, in turn, affect the banking and financial sector." 7 Furthermore, it
remains to be seen how China deals with economic factors such as a
growing presence and influence of foreign banks, which threaten or
inhibit their autonomy, independence, or power." 8
Analysis of this dynamic is made difficult by the fact that the
CCP's continued power and importance is "more a matter of political
reality than law."'' 9 For instance, Deng Xiaoping's power during the
tail end of his life did not derive from any particular body of law but
was simply political reality. 20 Moreover, there are no codified laws
for Democracy, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-026es.html (last visited Jan. 23,
2006).
111. See infra notes 113-31 and accompanying text.
112. Peerenboom, supra note 47, at 179.
113. Halverson, supra note 28, at 363.
114. Peerenboom, supra note 47, at 195.
115. Id. at 194-96.
116. Halverson, supra note 28, at 364.
117. See Pei Minxin, China is Paying the Price of Rising Social Unrest, FfN. TIMEs (Asia
Edition), Nov. 7, 2005 at 15; see also As the Economy Booms, So Does Unrest,
ECONOMIST.COM, Dec. 13, 2005 (on file with North Carolina Banking Institute).
118. Chandrasekhar, supra note 75; see also William 1. Friedman, One Country, Two
Systems: The Inherent Conflict Between China's Communist Politics and Capitalist
Securities Market, 27 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 477, 480 (2002) ("However, with the
implementation of these Western capitalist market theories into the Chinese marketplace,
the survival of the Party will be at stake.").
119. Peerenboom, supra note 47, at 201.
120. Id.
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which govern the CCP's practice of the "nomenklatura system of
appointments whereby the CCP appoints or approves the appointments
of key personnel, usually CCP members, to positions of power within
all of the major institutions, including the people's congresses,
governments, courts and administrative agencies.''1
21
The CCP has and will continue to retain final control while at
the same time embracing the modernization that accompanies economic
growth.122 And because much of the CCP's conduits of power exist
outside of any clear laws, it is impossible to know how they will affect
and be affected by the vast economic changes. 23  Foreign investors
must be aware of these realities and understand that they bring with
them social and political uncertainties. 1
24
Looking to the future it is conceivable that the government,
under the direction of the CCP, might act in direct and indirect ways to
prevent foreign banks from gaining too much control over China's
domestic banking sector.125 As discussed above, China does not intend
121. Id. at 201-02.
122. Halverson, supra note 28, at 321.
123. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 107-22 and accompanying text.
125. Bremner, supra note 3.
Beijing still insists the government retain a majority stake in its Big
Four state banks. (Post-IPO, China Construction Bank will be 62.5%
owned by the state.) China has refused, despite pressure from
Washington, to lift its twenty-five percent cap on total equity held by
outsiders and twenty percent for any single investor.... Beijing,
meanwhile, is still keeping as tight a grip on bank reform as it has on
its broader economic opening-despite a weeklong visit by U.S.
Treasury Secretary Snow and Securities and Exchange Commission
Chairman Christopher Cox. In meetings with PBOC Governor Zhou
Xiaochuan and China Securities Regulatory Commission Chairman
Shang Fulin, Cox says he heard a lot of talk about gradual steps, not
quick leaps. As Cox puts it: 'If you take nothing but half-steps to
reach the wall, will you ever reach it?
Id.; see also Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Offers Details of Plan for Open
Markets in China, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, at 4.
That could backfire. Chinese leaders invariably bristle at pressure from
American officials, and they could view the new American 'priorities'
as an unwelcome intrusion.... But many of the Bush administration's
proposals would encounter fierce political opposition from many
quarters. China's state-owned banks and far-flung rural credit
cooperatives have many defenders in the ruling [CCP], and they are
certain to oppose well-financed competition from Western banks. Even
without opposition from vested interests, many Chinese leaders are
likely to fret over giving more freedom to foreign financial institutions
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
to raise the cap on foreign investment in Chinese banks. 126 And while
the Chinese government may consider isolated exceptions to the limit,
such as a possible approval of Citibank's recent majority acquisition of
Guangdong Development Bank ("GDB"), such action does not
necessarily signal an overall policy shift. 127 As many have pointed out,
GDB is not in good financial shape and is not nearly large enough to
pose a significant threat to the control exerted by the Big Four. 28
Rather, such events should more likely be interpreted in light of
an overall policy framework such as that articulated in recent comments
by Shi Jiliang, a vice-chairman of the CBRC. 129  Jiliang hinted at
potential actions by the government that would limit the ability of
foreign banks to compete directly with domestic banks: "China may
restrain the expansion of foreign banks to protect local lenders from
'excessive competition.' 130 Such comments make clear that China may
not be as willing to open the market as some might expect but, instead,
intend to utilize foreign investment within the framework of national
policy.' 3'
IV. EQUITY IN CHINESE BANKS
Despite all of the problems discussed above, many banks still
see China as a promising investment opportunity. 3 2  Such banks are
convinced that "China has fundamental advantages over the U.S." in
to enter Chinese markets.
Id.
126. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
127. David Barboza & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Citigroup Expected to Land China Deal,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2005, at C 1; see also George Yang, Japan Lender in Talks for BOC
Equity, THE STANDARD, Jan. 5, 2006 ("A Citigroup-led consortium has won an auction for
about 85 percent of Guangzhou-based [GDB], which is widely regarded as a special case
due to the mainland lender's large debt burden, and the imminent deal does not necessarily
indicate a wider opening for foreign banks.").
128. Barboza & Sorkin, supra note 127.
129. Richard McGregor, Beiing May Look to Protect Local Banks From Competition,
FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 28, 2005, at 13.
130. Id; see also David Lague & Donald Greenlees, China's Troubled Banks Lure
Investors, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 22, 2005, at 13, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/09/21/business/bank.php ("But many doubt that China
will ever relax the rules enough to permit foreigners to gain control of any major bank.");
George Yang, New Rules to Stabilize Financial Security, THE STANDARD, Nov. 3, 2005.
131. McGregor, supra note 129.
132. See infra notes 133-51 and accompanying text.
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terms of future earnings potential.'33 Commentators point to the
breathtaking pace of growth of the Chinese economy and the enormous
personal savings of the Chinese, a large source of underutilized
capital. 3 4 Furthermore, the very largest U.S. banks such as Bank of
America ("B of A") are or will eventually be limited in their domestic
activities by the ten percent overall deposit cap still currently in place.'
However, foreign banks seeking to expand into China have been
faced with the choice between establishing foreign bank branches or
acquiring equity in domestic banks. 136  Thus far, such banks have
overwhelmingly chosen to pursue equity acquisition.'37
A. Recent Investment Activity
The first wave of foreign investment in Chinese banks occurred
between 2001 and 2003.138 During that period, seven major foreign
corporations purchased equity in Chinese banks. 3 9  The largest
acquisition during this period was Citigroup's investment in the
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank ("SPDB") in January 2003.14°
Citigroup invested $72 million, acquiring a five percent ownership
interest with an option to increase its investment in the future.
141
In 2004, a new wave of investment began which dwarfed
previous activity. 42 In August 2004, the British bank, Hong Kong and
Shanghai Bank ("HSBC"), paid $1.75 billion to acquire a 19.9% share
of the Bank of Communications.143  In 2005, B of A invested $2.5
billion in China Construction Bank, receiving a nine percent stake in the
133. George Zhibin Gu, A Clearer Path Ahead for China's Banks?, ASIA TIMES, July 2,
2005, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GG02Ad05.html.
134. Id.
135. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 46, at 739-40.
136. Liu, supra note 4, at 417-18.
137. See infra notes 138-51 and accompanying text.
138. Min Xu, Feeding Frenzy for Overseas Banks, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Sept. 30, 2005,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ChinaBusiness/GI30CbO3.html.
139. Id.
140. Id.; Citigroup to Take 5 Percent of Shanghai Pudong Bank, PEOPLE'S DAILY
ONLINE, Jan. 3, 2003, http://english.people.com.cn/200301/03/eng20030103_109481.shtml.
141. Citigroup to Buy More Shares of Pudong Bank, TAIPEI TIMES, Aug. 26, 2005,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/worldbiz/archives/2005/08/26/2003269247.
142. Xu, supra note 138.
143. Id.
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bank, 144 which, at the time, was the single largest foreign investment in
the Chinese banking sector. 45  B of A also retained the option to
increase its equity stake in China Construction Bank to 19.9%.146 In
July 2005, Temasek acquired an estimated ten percent equity stake in
China Construction Bank for $2.4 billion. 47  In August 2005, a
consortium of investors led by Goldman Sachs paid $3.5 billion to
acquire a ten percent stake in the Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China, China's largest lender, 48 and Citigroup announced plans to
increase its stake in SPDB to 19.9%. 14 9 Another investment consortium,
led by Royal Bank of Scotland, paid $3.1 billion to acquire a ten percent
equity interest in the Bank of China. 50  The growth in foreign
investment was staggering, as foreign investors poured over $18 billion
into the Chinese market during the years 2004 and 2005.''
B. Purchasing Equity in Established Chinese Banks is the
Safest, Fastest, and Most Efficient Way to Enter China's Market
in the Short Term
Purchasing equity in established banks is the safest, fastest and
most efficient way for foreign banks to acquire a stake in the Chinese
banking sector in the short term while avoiding or limiting some of the
risk factors discussed above. 152 The following factors contribute to the
current trend.1
53
144. 1d; Bank of America Invests 2.5 Billion U.S. Dollars in CCB, PEOPLE'S DAILY
ONLINE, June 17, 2005, http://english.people.com.cn/200506/17/eng20050617_1908
16.html; Bank of America Buys Stake in China Bank, MSNBC, June 17, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8253765/.
145. Bank ofAmerica Buys Stake in China Bank, supra note 144.
146. Bank ofAmerica Invests 2.5 Billion U.S. Dollars in CCB, supra note 144.
147. Chandrasekhar, supra note 75.
148. Bank ofAmerica Invests 2.5 Billion U.S. Dollars in CCB, supra note 144; Xu, supra
note 138.
149. Citigroup to Raise Pudong Bank Stake, CRI ONLINE, Sept. 12, 2005,
http://en.chinabroadcast.cn/855/2005/09/12/262@ 18793.htm.
150. Xu, supra note 138; RBS Leads $3.1bn China Investment, BBC NEWS, Aug. 18,
2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4162170.stm.
151. Jonathan Anderson, The Great Chinese Bank Sale, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 2005,
http://www.feer.com/articles1/2005/0509/free/p007.html.
152. See supra notes 39-131 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 154-95 and accompanying text.
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1. Immediate Rewards: Initial Public Offering
Acquiring a stake in established Chinese banks offers the
potential for immediate return on profit if the bank is able to complete
an initial public offering ("IPO"). 154  In October 2005, China
Construction Bank raised $8 billion in the first IPO of a major Chinese
bank.'55 For large foreign investors who acquire equity prior to the IPO,
there are potentially enormous returns to be had, at least on paper.
516
Analysts estimate that while B of A paid 1.15 times the book value
when it acquired equity in China Construction Bank, China
Construction Bank's stock will go public at 1.6 times its book value.
57
That would translate into a nearly $1 billion return on paper.'58 China's
other major banks also plan IPO's, though details are not certain and
immediate prospects are more tenuous. 159
2. Immediate, On-the-Ground Learning and Faster Acceleration into the
Market
By purchasing equity, foreign banks are able to gain experience
learning and navigating the Chinese administrative and judicial systems
from the inside of established banking operations. 160 In doing so, foreign
banks tap into invaluable experience and knowledge already possessed
by Chinese banks.' 6' Working with established domestic banks also
154. Bremner, supra note 3; Tim Lee Master, China Construction Bank Plans to Launch
US$ 5B IPO Next Month, THE STANDARD, Sept. 3, 2005.
155. David Barboza, Chinese Milestone: A Major Bank Goes Public, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
28, 2005, at C4.




160. Lague & Greenlees, supra note 130 ("These investments also allow foreign banks
to learn about the market and gain experience that can be applied to building their own
brands in China.").
161. Id.; see also Timothy O'Keeffe, China: An Evolving Market, JP MORGAN CHASE,
http://www.jpmorganchase.com/cm/ContentServer?cid=l 102380207137&pagename=jpmor
gan%2Fts%2FTS Content%2FGeneral&c=TSContent (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
By leveraging the local partner banks capability, treasurers will get the
best of both worlds. They will have unparalleled access to the best local
banking services, yet transact using a recognized standard of service
administered by the foreign overlay bank. This is beneficial to both the
domestic and foreign banks, with the treasurer reaping the benefits in
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allows foreign banks to utilize the existing resources and structures of
Chinese banks to gain faster access to the market. 162 For instance, by
acquiring equity in China Construction Bank, B of A was able to gain
access to a bank with a "huge footprint" and begin to establish a brand
name recognized by millions of potential customers. 163 B of A would
also be able to utilize the resources and experience of the third largest
bank in China, a bank with 14,500 branches and $472 billion in assets
(nearly thirteen percent of China's total deposits).'
64
A. CASE STUDY: CREDIT CARD MARKET
One particular example of this path of accelerated access and
growth is China's emerging credit card market. 65  After acquiring
equity in domestic banks, many foreign banks have proceeded to launch
joint credit card ventures in order to gain market share and establish
brand awareness. 66  By issuing credit cards in partnership with
domestic banks, foreign banks such as Citibank hope to use "local
bank's national distribution network for the jointly branded cards...
[and] more importantly, avoid the restrictions still preventing foreigners
from entering this business.' 67  Furthermore, such partnerships can
potentially accelerate the speed of entry as well as increase the scope of
market access. 68  For instance, Citibank was able to take part in a
enhanced service capabilities, as well as standardized practices,
automated processes and increased investment options.
Id.
162. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
163. Bremner, supra note 3; see also Arthur Clennam, Wish List Granted?:
Multinational Treasurers Have Reason to Applaud A Recent Easing of Cash Management
Restrictions in China, CFO ASIA, Nov. 2004.
Deutsche Bank's Yap also sees benefits in a partnership arrangement.
"Because of the strong partnerships that we struck up with many of the
Chinese banks,' he says, 'we get all the service levels in almost all
places. You can open accounts with us, and yet this also gives you
distribution across the country."
Id.
164. Gu, supra note 133.
165. See infra notes 166-83 and accompanying text.
166. Richard McGregor, Younger Generation Warms to Credit Culture: Foreign Banks
are Targeting Wealthier Clients with New Credit Card Services, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr.
29, 2003, at 3.
167. Id.
168. Citigroup's Deal for Credit Cards in China, BBC NEWS, Jan. 3, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/2624459.stm.
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nationwide credit card market just a year after its equity purchase,
bypassing much of the time and effort it would require to take such a
step independently.
169
Current statistics, though somewhat inconsistent, depict a credit
card market that is highly underdeveloped but possesses enormous
opportunity for growth. 70 In 2003, only about 20 million of China's 1.3
billion consumers owned credit cards.' 7 ' Other sources put the number
as low as 1 million. 172 And as late as 2003, China still lacked a national
bank clearing system with the capability to handle extensive
transactions. 173 As a result, a majority of those who owned cards were
only able to use them locally.'74 But some believe that the credit card
market in China is in the beginning stages of a rapid 
expansion.175
Market research done by the McKinsey & Company showed that the
number of credit cards issued in China rose to 12 million in 2005.176 In
this context, foreign banks hope to utilize their expertise in the areas of
retail banking and credit cards to help the credit card market mature and
to establish a presence in the market as well.1
77
There have been many notable joint credit card ventures
launched in the past two years. 178 In January 2004, HSBC and the Bank
of Shanghai announced the launch of the Shanghai International Credit
Card.179 In February 2004, SPDB and Citibank issued Visa cards which
were the first credit cards which "can be settled both in renminbi and
U.S. dollars and which are supported by international cards
169. Id.
170. See infra notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
171. Citigroup 's Deal for Credit Cards in China, supra note 168.
172. Citigroup Buys into China's Cards Potential, RETAIL BANKER INT'L,
Jan. 14, 2003, at 2.
173. Citigroup's Deal for Credit Cards in China, supra note 168.
174. Id.
175. Credit Card Fastest-Growing Retail Banking Business in China, CHINA DAILY,
Sept. 14, 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-09/14/content_477886.htm.
176. Id.
177. McGregor, supra note 166; Phillips supra note 78 ("Our research shows that credit
cards, bank accounts and insurance products will be strongly in demand over the next 12
months, at least from the Chinese mass affluent market. Of this group...54.11 per cent get a
new credit card").
178. See infra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
179. Banks Launch Credit Card, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 2, 2004, http://www.china
daily.com.cn/en/doc/2004-01/02/content_295406.htm.
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management and technology expertise."' 180 Using its partnership with
SPDB to get a jump on the credit card market prior to the full easing of
banking restrictions in 2006, Citibank aims to "spin off the credit card
business into a separate unit as soon as regulations permit."'' In the
interim, Citibank "will effectively be running the business, using its
own technology, and the cards will carry both banks' names."' 8 2 The
perceived value of entry into the credit card market is made clear by the
head of Citibank's operations in China, who believes that while
Citibank may not be able to compete with established banks in lending
to private companies, the biggest opportunities involve exploration of
consumer banking such as credit cards.183
3. Common Goals
By acquiring equity, foreign banks also tie their fortunes
initially to established banks, many of which are still majority-owned by
the government. 184 Given China's government's possible wariness
towards any foreign bank's dominating influence, this route may
perhaps make foreign bank's increased presence more palatable.'85
180. Press Release, Citigroup Inc., Shanghai Pudong Development Bank and Citibank
Launch Credit Cards in China (Feb. 04, 2004) http://www.citigroup.com/citigroup
/press/2004/040204a.htm.
181. Citigroup Buys into China's Cards Potential, supra note 172.
182. Id.
183. McGregor, supra note 166.
184. Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern, MILKEN INST., http://www.milken
institute.org/events/events.tafifunction=detail&ID=164&cat=Forums (last visited Jan. 23,
2006). While concrete data as to the percentage of the banking industry currently held by
either Chinese government or local or provincial governments is inconsistent, James R.
Barth and Gerard Caprio, Jr asserted in December 2005 that "ninety-eight percent of the
banking assets are government owned." Id.; see also Luo Ping, China Banking Regulatory
Comm'n, Challenges for China's Banking Sector and Policy Responses, at 2 (November,
2003), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/apd/seminars/2003/newdelhi/ping.pdf
(Pointing out that primary stockholders of the so-called "second tier" banks (joint-stock
commercial banks) are local governments and state-owned or state-controlled enterprises);
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, & Andrei Shleifer, Government Ownership of
Banks 37 (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Res., Discussion Paper No. 1890, Feb. 2000) (concluding
that ninety-nine percent of the share of the assets of the top ten banks in China was owned
or controlled by the government).
185. Bremner, supra note 3.
Beijing's grand plan is to fix the main banks, inject foreign capital and
expertise into the system, clean up the local bourses-and throw the
financial markets virtually completely open to outside competition by
December 6, 2006.... Neither China nor its banks have the managerial
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Furthermore, such partnerships are welcomed by China because the
Chinese banks are able to gain much needed experience and know-how
from the foreign banks.
186
For instance, in conjunction with B of A's investment in China
Construction Bank, B of A plans to send a team of fifty managers into
China to teach China Construction Bank managers basic banking tools
and methodologies. 187 The B of A managers will train their Chinese
counterparts in the basic skills of drafting loans in accordance with the
particular risk levels faced as well as the accepted American practices of
due diligence, which are still relatively new concepts in the Chinese
banking sector. 188  B of A will also help China Construction Bank
develop and modernize its information technology and corporate
governance practices.1
8 9
The joint development of the emerging credit card market also
dovetails nicely with other central government objectives.'"
0 China has
recognized its need to increase consumer spending, hoping that such
spending can begin to take the place of the government's fiscal
stimulus, which to this point, has been the primary driving force of
China's economic growth.' 9' During a recent visit to China, Treasury
Secretary John W. Snow echoed this sentiment, encouraging the
resources they need to build a better banking system. For that they are
depending on investors like [B of A].
Id.; see also Billion-Dollar Gamble, supra note 76 ("It may also be that the
Chinese banks will simply want to learn the tricks of the trade from their
western partners before freezing them out."); David Lague, Betting High on
Risky China, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 21, 2005, at 12 ("The plan is that this
new capital will put the banks on a sounder financial footing while foreign
investors assist their Chinese partners to try and put an end to entrenched
mismanagement, corruption and poor lending practices.").
186. Master, supra note 154; see also China Industry: CCB Selling Promise of Chinese
Banks, ECONOMIST: EIU VIEWSWIRE, Oct. 5, 2005, http://www.viewswire.com
/index.asp?layout=display_article&docid=919467077 ("Moreover, if their new foreign
partners can help China's banks to better identify stronger, less risky loan opportunities, the
banks in turn will find themselves contributing to sustained and sustainable economic
growth."); Louise Do Rosario, Preparing for the Competition-China 's Barriers to Foreign
Banks Will Soon Be Coming Down but Their Expertise Will Also Be Useful to Local
Institutions, BANKER, Mar. 1, 2004 ("The CBRC has recently issued well-publicized
statements praising foreign banks that have acquired stakes in Chinese banks for their
'significant contribution' to these entities.").
187. Bremner, supra note 3.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See infra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
191. McGregor, supra note 166.
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Chinese towards increased spending and use of credit as well as
increasing sophistication and modernization in their financial sector.192
Many speculate that increased use of credit cards and familiarity with a
credit culture will, in turn, lead to more consumer spending and vice
versa. 193
Recent surveys have also indicated that the general public in
China also believes that foreign partnerships will improve the overall
quality of banking services. 1 94 Such partnerships, it is believed, will
lead to less corruption and improved service. 95
V. CONCLUSION
To date, foreign investment in the banking sector of China has
consisted mainly of equity acquisition in Chinese banks. 196 This route
into China's banking market addresses some of the major uncertainties
and concerns associated with the Chinese market.' 97 First, equity
acquisition offers the possibility of great initial return on investment in
the event that the domestic bank is able to muster an IPO. 98 Second,
investors are able to gain access to the market using the resources and
the existing "footprint" of these established banks. 99 Such access also
allows banks to get a foot in the door of the emerging credit market in
China.200 Eventually, foreign banks will have to establish independent
operations if they wish to grow beyond the cap imposed on overall
foreign ownership of domestic banks, but equity ownership allows
banks to begin the learning process immediately.20' Third, working
with established banks creates a situation in which the goals and
objectives of the investors coincide with those of China's government,
192. Edmund L. Andrews, Snow Urges Consumerism on China Trip, N. Y. TIMES, Oct.
14, 2005, at C1.
193. McGregor, supra note 166.
194. Phillips, supra note 78.
195. Id.
196. See supra notes 138-51 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 154-95 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 165-83 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 160-83 and accompanying text.
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thereby decreasing any tension or uncertainties that might result from a
growing foreign presence in the banking market.20 2
JACK E. JIRAK
202. See supra notes 184-95 and accompanying text.
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